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UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE
Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Horton v. California,' the United States Supreme Court held
that inadvertent discovery is not required for a seizure of evidence
under the plain view doctrine. 2 While supporting other limitations
on the plain view doctrine, the Court concluded that the interests of
law enforcement are better served without the inadvertency require-
ment.- In addition, the Court concluded that inadvertent discovery
is not necessary for the protection of fourth amendment interests.
4
Examining Horton, this Note concludes that the Supreme
Court's holding correctly balanced the needs of law enforcement
and the interests protected by the fourth amendment. This Note
reasons that whether defined subjectively or objectively, the inad-
vertency requirement imposes substantial costs on effective law en-
forcement. This Note also asserts that the inadvertency
requirement furtherg no fourth amendment interest, as represented
by the continued prohibition of general searches and seizures. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that the Court's abolishment of the inad-
vertency requirement may permit abuse of the plain view doctrine
through pretextual searches. However, concern over the limited
possibility of pretextual activity is offset by the benefits created for
law enforcement officials and the Court's continued protection of
fourth amendment interests. The Horton Court thus correctly abol-
ished the inadvertent discovery requirement.
1 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
2 Id. at 2308. See infra notes 5-21 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
plain view doctrine.
3 Id. at 2308-09.
4 Id. at 2309-10.
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II. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 By requiring a
search warrant to include a particular description of the place to be
searched, the fourth amendment protects the individual's interest in
maintaining personal privacy. 6 Similarly, by requiring a particular
description of the items to be seized, the fourth amendment pro-
tects the individual's interest in possessing personal property. 7 A
search or seizure not meeting these requirements is presumed un-
reasonable.8 However, there exist "a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. 9 One
of these exceptions, the plain view doctrine, allows the warranless
seizure of evidence observed by officers during lawful activity.10
5 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens,J., concurring) (distinguishing
between the interests protected by the prohibition of unreasonable searches and the
interests protected by the prohibition of unreasonable seizures).
7 Id.
8 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted) (electronic sur-
veillance of a telephone booth constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment).
The Court has enumerated several exceptions to the per se rule against warrantless
searches and seizures. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (open
fields); Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)) (hot
pursuit); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile search); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of person and surrounding area inci-
dent to arrest); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border
searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); United States v.Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)
(consent searches); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (abandoned property).
"For the most part, these exceptions are based upon a conclusion that under certain
circumstances, the exigencies of a situation make immediate search and seizure without
benefit of a warrant imperative." United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1293 (6th Cir.
1979).
10 A series of cases established the plain view doctrine, culminating in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion). See Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 461 (1948) (Burton, J., dissenting); Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 669, 714-15 (1948) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). See also Lewis & Mannle, Warrantless Seizures and the
"Plain View" Doctrine: Current Perspective, 12 CRIM. L. Buu.. 5, 7-17 (1976) [hereinafter
Lewis & Mannle].
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In Coolidge v. New Hampshire," the Supreme Court announced
the parameters of the plain view doctrine.1 2 To permit the seizure
of evidence under the plain view doctrine, the Court required the
following conditions: (1) the officers' "initial intrusion" or occu-
pancy of the viewing area must be lawful; (2) the incriminating char-
acter of the evidence viewed must be "immediately apparent" to the
officers; and (3) the officers' discovery of the evidence must be "in-
advertent."' 3 Officers satisfy the first requirement if the entry to
search is authorized by a warrant or one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement.' 4 The second requirement is satisfied if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the items observed are
contraband or evidence of a crime. 15
After Coolidge, however, debate continued over whether inad-
vertent discovery was necessary for a plain view seizure.' 6 Forty-six
11 403 U.S. 443 (plurality opinion).
12 Id. at 464-71 (plurality opinion).
13 Brown, 460 U.S. at 736-37 (plurality opinion) (summarizing the plain view doctrine
after Coolidge) (citations omitted).
In Coolidge, officers acting under the authority of a warrant arrested the defendant
and seized his automobile. 403 U.S. at 447-48 (plurality opinion). Subsequent searches
of the car produced evidence used in the defendant's conviction. Id. at 448 (plurality
opinion). On review, the Supreme Court invalidated the warrant because it had not
been issued by a neutral judicial officer. The state then unsuccessfully argued that de-
spite the invalid warrant, the search of the automobile was lawful under the plain view
doctrine. Id. at 453, 464-73 (plurality opinion). In the plurality opinion in which Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined, Justice Stewart established the conditions
necessary for a plain view seizure, stating:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inad-
vertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves
to supplement the prior justification.. . and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is imme-
diately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.
Id. at 466 (plurality opinion).
The Court held the search in Coolidge was not "inadvertent" because "the police had
ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile's exact descrip-
tion and location well in advance; [and] they intended to seize it when they came upon
Coolidge's property." Id. at 472 (plurality opinion).
14 See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (officer may accompany arrested
person into private areas after arrest and seize items in plain view); Project, Sixteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1985-
1986, 75 GEo. LJ. 713, 756 (1987). See supra note 9 for cases that establish exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
15 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that to make a plain view
seizure, an officer must have probable cause to believe the item seized constitutes evi-
dence of a crime or contraband).
16 In Brown, the Supreme Court remained divided over the inadvertent discovery re-
quirement. The plurality opinion stated "[w]hatever may be the final disposition of the
'inadvertence' element of 'plain view,' it clearly was no bar to the seizure here." Brown,
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states, the District of Columbia, and twelve United States Courts of
Appeal have adopted the inadvertency requirement.1 7 On the other
hand, some courts have refused to apply the doctrine, noting that
only a plurality of four justices supported the inadvertent discovery
requirement in Coolidge.' Sixteen years after Coolidge, in Arizona v.
Hicks, 19 Justice White noted that the inadvertent discovery require-
ment still had not been adopted by a majority of the Supreme
Court.20 In Horton, a majority of the Court finally agreed on the
necessity of the inadvertent discovery requirement. 2
1
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Returning home from the San Jose Coin Club's annual coin
show on January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker found two masked
men in his garage.2 2 One man carried a machine gun, and the other
brandished an electrical shocking device known as a "stun gun.''23
The two men bound Wallaker and robbed him of the cash entrusted
to him as the coin club's treasurer.24 The men also took collector
coins, jewelry, and three rings from Wallaker's fingers. 25 During the
course of the robbery, Wallaker spoke with the two men. 26 Later,
Wallaker identified Terry Brice Horton, a fellow coin collector with
whom Wallaker had conversed on several occasions, as one of his
assailants. 27 Horton's attendance at the coin show on the day of the
robbery supported this identification, as did a witness who saw the
robbers leaving the scene.28
Based on Wallaker's and the other witness' identification, Ser-
460 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion). In concurring, Justice White stated, "I continue to
disagree with the views of four Justices in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, that plain view
seizures are valid only if the viewing is 'inadvertent.'" Id. at 744 (White, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). On the other hand, Justice Powell believed that the plain view doc-
trine articulated in Coolidge should not be criticized after over a decade of acceptance. Id.
at 746 (Powell, J., concurring).
17 Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
appendices to Horton provide a complete list of the courts adopting the inadvertency
requirement. Id. at 2314-16.
18 See North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09, 14
Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (1972); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P.2d 969, 974
(1974); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 n.3 (Utah 1983).
19 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
20 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 330 (White, J., concurring).
21 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308.









geant Gary LaRault, an experienced police officer, believed he had
probable cause to search Horton's residence for both the robbery
proceeds and the weapons used.29 His affidavit requesting a war-
rant to search Horton's residence included a police report describ-
ing both the robbery proceeds and weapons.30 The magistrate,
however, issued a warrant authorizing a search only for the pro-
ceeds, including the three particularly described rings.31
On January 30, 1985, Sergeant LaRault searched Horton's
house without finding the stolen rings or other robbery proceeds.3 2
During the search, LaRault observed in plain view several weapons
described in the police report.33 He seized "an Uzi machine gun, a
.38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin
Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing described by
[Wallaker]." 3 4 The evidence seized was not discovered "inadver-
tently" because LaRault testified that he was searching not only for
the robbery proceeds described in the warrant, but also for other
evidence associated with the crime.3 5
Denying Horton's motion to suppress the evidence seized dur-
ing the search of his home, the trial court convicted Horton of
armed robbery.3 6 The California Appellate Court affirmed the con-
viction.3 7 Relying on the holding of the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in North v. Superior Court,38 the appellate court concluded that the
plain view requirement of inadvertence announced in Coolidge was





33 Id. at 2304-05.
34 Id. at 2305. "Although [LaRault] viewed other handguns and rifles, he did not
sieze them because there was no probable cause to believe they were associated with
criminal activity." Id. at 2305 n.1.
35 Id. at 2305.
36 Id. at 2304-05.
37 Id. at 2305.
38 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972). In North, during an
arrest, officers seized and later searched the defendant's car. Id. at 304-05, 502 P.2d at
1306, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The officers recognized the automobile as incriminating
evidence, but they did not obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure and search of the
automobile. Id. at 305, 502 P.2d at 1306-07, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. In upholding the
plain view seizure, the court reasoned:
If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as precedent, we
would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the discov-
ery of petitioner's car was no more "inadvertent" than in Coolidge. However, that
portion of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which proposed the adoption of new
restrictions to the "plain view" rule was signed by only four members of the court
(Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.).
Id. at 307, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
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four of the nine United States Supreme Court Justices.3 9 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied Horton's petition for review,40 and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a plain view seizure required inadvertent discovery.
4 1
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Affirming the California Appellate Court decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that inadvertent discovery was not nec-
essary for the warrantless seizure of evidence under the plain view
doctrine. 42 Writing for the majority,43 Justice Stevens concluded
that two flaws existed in the plurality opinion that established the
plain view doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement.44 First,
Justice Stevens reasoned that search and seizure rules based on the
objective rather than the subjective state of mind of the officer bet-
ter served the purposes of law enforcement. 45 Second, Justice Ste-
vens viewed the fourth amendment's underlying purpose of
preventing general searches as not mandating the plain view doc-
trine's inadvertent discovery requirement.
4 6
1. Application of Ob'ective Standards
The Court concluded that the subjective intentions of a police
officer should not affect the propriety of a search under the plain
view doctrine.47 The fact that a police officer anticipates finding evi-
dence that is not included in the list of items specifically described in
the search warrant should not invalidate the seizure of the evi-
dence.48 Because additional items would only expand the area he or
she may lawfully search, the Court concluded that a police officer
has no motivation to omit items for which he or she believes he or
she has probable cause to search.49 Only a mistake or oversight
could explain an officer's failure to include such items in a
39 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2305.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2304.
43 Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice
Blackman, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. Id.
44 Id. at 2308.
45 Id. at 2308-09.







In support of this reasoning, the majority referred to an exam-
ple given by Justice White in his dissent in Coolidge.51 In this exam-
ple, Justice White asked the reader to suppose that officers obtained
a warrant to search for a rifle.5 2 While limiting their search to areas
where a rifle might be found, the officers observed, in plain view,
two photographs.5 3 Justice White further asked the reader to sup-
pose that the officers inadvertently found one photograph, but an-
ticipated finding the other.M Justice White asserted that if the
Court held inadvertent discovery to be a requirement for search and
seizure under the plain view doctrine, then only one of the photo-
graphs could be seized.55 However, Justice White concluded that in
terms of the fourth amendment, the possessory right interfered with
is the same if either photograph is seized.3 6 The officers' judgment
regarding the possibility of finding the first photograph is no more
reliable than their judgment concerning the second photograph.5 7
In addition, the danger of losing the evidence remains the same to
each photograph if the officers must leave the premises to secure
another warrant.58
2. General Warrants Remain Unconstitutional
The Court further concluded that abolishing the plain view
doctrine's inadvertent discovery requirement would not convert
specific warrants to general warrants. 59 Justice Stevens recognized
that for a magistrate to issue a warrant, the fourth amendment re-
quired that the warrant "particularly describ[es] the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." 60 He argued that,
by itself, this requirement sufficiently limited the scope and duration
of the search. 6' Requiring that the evidence seized in plain view be
discovered inadvertently served no further purpose. 62
50 Id. at 2309 n.9 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 517 (1971)
(White, J., dissenting)).









60 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States
No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2309-10.
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As applied to the present case, the Court found that the officers
limited their search of Horton's residence to areas in which the
three rings and other items included in the warrant could have been
found. 63 If the rings and other items included in the warrant had
been found immediately, the search would have concluded and no
general search for weapons could have taken place.64
The Court also reasoned that the inadvertent discovery require-
ment did not further the fourth amendment's purpose of protecting
privacy rights. 65 The Court stated that the privacy interest was in-
fringed when the items came into plain view during a search,
whether or not the police anticipated seeing the items.66 Once the
suspect's privacy was invaded through the issuance of a warrant de-
fining the scope of the search, inadvertent discovery should not be a
requirement for the seizure of items subsequently found. 67 In the
present case, the Court concluded that Horton's privacy and posses-
sory rights were not violated, because the search was authorized by
the warrant and the seizure was authorized under the plain view
doctrine.
68
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing in dissent,69Justice Brennan supported the position ad-
vanced by Justice Stewart in Coolidge.70 Relying heavily on the lan-
guage of the fourth amendment, Justice Brennan asserted that the
fourth amendment was designed to protect equally the interests of
privacy and possession.71 Justice Brennan reasoned that the fourth
amendment protected these interests by requiring a magistrate to
determine the area to be searched and the items to be seized. 72 Jus-
tice Brennan concluded that the possessory interests were better
protected by the magistrate than by officers in the performance of
their duties. 73 He stated that just as the search of an area without a
warrant was per se unreasonable, the seizure of items without a war-
rant was also per se unreasonable.74





68 Id. at 2311.
69 Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan stated that in order to avoid the inconvenience
of obtaining a warrant for newly discovered evidence, the plain view
doctrine allowed the seizure of evidence not described particularly
in the original warrant. 75 However, the rationale of avoiding the
inconvenience of obtaining another warrant was not present when
the officers anticipated finding the evidence, and thus the inadver-
tent discovery requirement should be upheld. 76 Justice Brennan
further noted the wide acceptance by state courts and law enforce-
ment agencies of the inadvertent discovery requirement.77
Justice Brennan then addressed what the majority believed
were two flaws in the inadvertent discovery requirement of the plain
view doctrine.78 Justice Brennan concluded that possessory inter-
ests were invaded whenever an officer had probable cause to obtain
a warrant, but seized items without obtaining the warrant.79 By re-
quiring seizure of items in plain view to be inadvertent, the officers
would be more diligent in obtaining search warrants.80 Justice
Brennan also concluded that without the inadvertency requirement,
officers would attempt to avoid the often time-consuming warrant
application process.8 ' For example, an officer having probable
cause to search for a large number of items may obtain a warrant
only for a few items.8 2 Justice Brennan argued that the officer ra-
tionally may find the risk of immediately finding the items on the
warrant and having to conclude his or her search outweighed by the
time saved in the warrant application process.
83
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's assertion that
because the scope and duration of the search was limited by the
items specified in the warrant, no additional interest was protected
by the inadvertent discovery requirement.8 4 While conceding that
the inadvertency requirement furthered no privacy interest, Justice
Brennan concluded that it did protect possessory interests.8 5 Justice
Brennan cited Illinois v. Andreas for the proposition that once an item
is observed during a plain view search, the owner loses his or her
privacy interest, but still retains his or her interest in possessing the
75 Id. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 470 (1971)).
76 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470).
77 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).




Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the majority's decision
would have limited impact and did not extend to permit pretextual
searches.87 Justice Brennan reasoned that officers should not be
able to deliberately avoid the fourth amendment warrant require-
ments by obtaining a warrant to search for items from one crime,
with the intention of seizing items in plain view from another crime,
or using the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement to
seize items in plain view.88 Justice Brennan supported this point by
noting that the state courts which had rejected the inadvertent dis-
covery requirement had not held the fourth amendment to allow
pretextual searches.8 9
V. ANALYSIS
The resolution of fourth amendment issues requires the strik-
ing of a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and
the need for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court in Horton properly balanced these interests by eliminat-
ing the plain view doctrine's cumbersome and unnecessary inadver-
tent discovery requirement. In so doing, the Court advanced the
interests of effective law enforcement by eliminating a confusing,
impossible to define standard. More importantly, the Court's elimi-
nation of the inadvertent discovery requirement does not diminish
the fourth amendment's purpose of protecting against unreasonable
searches and seizures. One could argue that the abolition of the
inadvertency requirement by Horton allows abuse of the plain view
doctrine through pretextual searches. However, the possibility of
abuse is severely limited by the plain view doctrine's other require-
ments. Thus, the Court correctly abolished the inadvertent discov-
ery requirement to the plain view doctrine.
A. THE POSITIVE EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
In announcing the inadvertent discovery requirement to the
plain view doctrine in Coolidge, Justice Stewart failed to define what
86 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)).
87 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Pretextual searches and seizures objectively appear
reasonable, but actually are conducted for reasons different than those underlying the
creation of the fourth amendment power which authorizes the activity. See Haddad,
Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 639, 641-43
(1985) [hereinafter Haddad]. See infra notes 122-134 and accompanying text for a com-
plete discussion of the impact of the elimination of the inadvertent discovery require-
ment on pretextual activity.
88 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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level of expectation on the part of the seizing officer constitutes "in-
advertency." 90 While the majority of courts accepted the inadver-
tency requirement,9' judges and commentators continued to
struggle over whether the level of expectation necessary for inadver-
tency should be defined by the subjective mind of the officer or by
the existence of objective probable cause.92 In Horton, Justice Ste-
vens correctly concluded that the elimination of the inadvertent dis-
covery requirement to the plain view doctrine would facilitate fair
law enforcement. 93 While he demonstrated the costs imposed on
law enforcement by a subjective standard, Justice Stevens failed to
address the effects of applying an objective standard of inadver-
tency.94 However, whether defined subjectively or objectively, the
90 The "most serious problem with the plurality's approach to plain view is thatJus-
tice Stewart nowhere defined the degree of expectation required to make a discovery by
the police inadvertent." The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 244 (1971)
[hereinafter The Supreme Court, 1970 Term].
In establishing the inadvertent discovery requirement, Justice Stewart stated:
The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement.., is that a plain-view
seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a "general"
one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discov-
ery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where police know in advance
the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether differ-
ent. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or
at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards war-
rantless searches as 'per se unreasonable' in the absence of'exigent circumstances.'
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-71 (1971) (plurality opinion).
91 The appendices to Horton provide a complete list of courts accepting the inadver-
tent discovery requirement. 110 S. Ct. at 2314-16.
92 One commentator offered two possible interpretations of the inadvertency stan-
dard announced by Justice Stewart in Coolidge:
If the Rule is taken to mean that a plain-view discovery will be held invalid, because
not inadvertent, only when the police have probable cause to believe that the evi-
dence would be found, it will be of limited effect....
The inadvertence requirement will be far more significant if it is interpreted as
requiring the invalidation of discoveries when the police have an expectation that
evidence will be discovered on the premises but lack probable cause to search.
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 90, at 244-45. See also 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.11(d), at 351 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAVE]; Comment, Criminal
Procedure-"Inadvertence": The Increasingly Vestigial Prong of the Plain View Doctrine, 10 MEM.
ST. U.L. REv. 399, 401 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Criminal Procedure-'"Inadvertance"];
Note, Look But Don't Touch-The Limits on the Plain View Doctrine Following Arizona v. Hicks,
10 Gao. MASON U.L. Rav. 533, 536 (1988).
93 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308-09.
94 Justice Stevens concluded that, "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by
the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend on
the subjective state of mind of the officer." Id. at 2308-09. However, in demonstrating
the problems associated with the inadvertent discovery requirement, Justice Stevens
failed to state clearly if the same problems would result from the application of an objec-
tive probable cause standard of inadvertency. Justice Stevens appears to address the
subjective mind of the officer in stating:
if he or she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion con-
cerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see, why
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
inadvertent discovery requirement imposes substantial costs on law
enforcement, and thus was correctly abolished.
The Court in Horton correctly refused to apply a subjective stan-
dard of inadvertency. The subjective approach to inadvertency al-
lows the admission of evidence seized under the plain view doctrine
if the officer did not either anticipate or subjectively possess prob-
able cause to search for the item. This approach imposes intolera-
ble costs on law enforcement by arbitrarily excluding evidence,
penalizing officers for not seeking broader warrants, and creating
further evidentiary problems at trial.
Justice Stevens effectively demonstrated the subjective stan-
dard's arbitrary exclusion of evidence through an example given by
Justice White in Coolidge.95 Suppose while searching for a rifle listed
in the warrant, an officer finds two incriminating photographs. If
the officer anticipated finding one photograph and not the other,
under a subjective standard of inadvertency the officer could seize
only the photograph he or she did not anticipate finding. However,
the danger to the evidence and the inconvenience to law enforce-
ment are equal if an officer must obtain another warrant for seizure.
The subjective standard of inadvertency undermines effective law
enforcement by arbitrarily excluding incriminating evidence.
Furthermore, the subjective standard actually penalizes officers
who seek narrow warrants. For example, suppose an officer believes
probable cause exists to search for an item, but in good faith decides
not to include the item in his or her request for a warrant because he
or she is unsure of the likelihood of finding the item. If later found
in plain view during the course of the search, the item is excluded
because the officer anticipated its discovery. Thus, under the sub-
jective standard, incriminating evidence is suppressed when an of-
ficer requests a narrow warrant in an effort to limit the invasiveness
of the search.
Finally, an application of the subjective standard of inadver-
tency causes problems in evidentiary hearings. An officer's degree
of expectation that evidence will be found can vary from a "hunch"
to "practical certainty." In attempting to determine whether an of-
that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a
lawful search for the first.
Id. at 2309. Also, Justice White's example in Coolidge, which is referred to by Justice
Stevens, appears to address the subjective mind of the officer. Id. at 2309 (citing Coo-
lidge, 403 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting)). In distinguishing between two photo-
graphs, Justice White asks the reader to "assume also that the discovery of one
photograph was inadvertent but the finding of the other was anticipated." Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
95 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
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ficer anticipated or subjectively possessed probable cause, a court
effectively would be trying to label a concept that is impossible to
define. Litigation would arise over the credibility of the officer's tes-
timony that he or she did not believe probable cause existed to
search for the items seized under the plain view doctrine. Further-
more, if multiple officers were involved in the search, issues would
be raised over which officer's beliefs should be determinative. 96
The application of an objective probable cause standard of inad-
vertency also imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement. For
discovery to be sufficiently inadvertent to authorize a plain view
seizure under the objective standard, probable cause must not ob-
jectively exist to search for items not listed on the warrant for
seizure. The more accepted and reasonable view of Coolidge applies
this objective definition of inadvertency. 97 Under Coolidge, when the
evidence in plain view is not inadvertently discovered, the evidence
is left vulnerable to disturbance while the officer returns for a war-
rant to seize the evidence. The most reasonable explanation for
such a result is that probable cause must have objectively existed to
search for the unlisted items, and thus the officer could have ob-
tained a warrant for these items before commencing the search.
However, if the officer only subjectively believed probable cause ex-
isted, a warrant could not have been obtained before the search
commenced; thus, the evidence should not remain in danger of dis-
turbance while the warrant is obtained.98 While at first glance an
96 The Solicitor General pointed out several problems caused by the "subjective
probable cause" test.
First, in a case involving several officers, it would raise a question of which officer's
subjective beliefs should be consulted. Second, it would likely give rise to litigation
over the bona fides of the officer's testimony as to his beliefs, as well as challenges
to the reasonableness of those beliefs. Third, it would still penalize the cautious
officer who, while believing that he had probable cause to search for particular
items, decided not to request authorization to search for those items because he
regarded the likelihood that those items would be found on the premises to present
a close question.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Solicitor General for Respondent at 22 n.8, Horton v. Cali-
fornia, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164) [hereinafter Solicitor General's Brief].
97 Federal and state courts which apply the inadvertent discovery requirement gener-
ally adopt the probable cause standard of inadvertency. See Moylan, The Plain View Doc-
trine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv.
1047, 1083 & n.170 (1975)); Comment, "Plain View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides
the Lower Courts, 7 Lov. L.A.L. Rav. 489, 511 (1974); Note, State v. White: The "Inadver-
teney Requirement of the Plain View Doctrine in North Carolina, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1245, 1255
(1989) (citing Comment, Criminal Procedure-"Inadvertence, "supra note 92, at 402).
98 Lewis & Mannle, supra note 10, at 19.
The reasoning behind interpreting Coolidge as applying an objective probable cause
standard can be summarized as follows:
If the 'inadvertent discovery' limitation is to make any sense at all, however, it must
at least mean that a discovery of objects not named in the warrant is always inadver-
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objective standard of inadvertency appears reasonable, the applica-
tion of the objective standard also imposes substantial costs on law
enforcement. It suppresses evidence because of mistake or over-
sight, penalizes officers who do not request broad warrants, and cre-
ates evidentiary problems at trial.
First, Justice Stevens pointed out that the objective inadvertent
discovery requirement suppresses evidence because of mistake or
oversight. Justice Stevens reasoned that an officer with probable
cause to search for an item possessed no motivation for omitting
that item from his or her search warrant request.99 If probable
cause to search for an item objectively existed, upon application by
an officer, the item would be included in the warrant. The probable
explanation for the failure to include such an item was either the
officer's mistake in recognizing that probable cause existed to search
for the item or an oversight in the warrant application process. 100
However, under the objective standard of inadvertency, the evi-
dence is excluded because probable cause did exist to search for the
item. Thus, the objective standard of inadvertency causes a severe
injustice by suppressing incriminating evidence as a result of mis-
take or oversight.' 0l
In HortonJustice Brennan disagreed withJustice Stevens on the
deterrent effect of the inadvertency requirement on unreasonable
searches and seizures. 10 2 Justice Brennan argued that absent the in-
advertent discovery requirement, officers would be motivated to
tent, without regard to the personal hopes or expectations of the executing officers,
if there were not sufficient grounds to justify the issuance of a warrant which also
named those objects which must be seized. In light of the fact thatJustice Stewart is
not prepared to require the police to return to the magistrate for a second warrant
when the discovery was 'inadvertent,' the only plausible explanation for requiring
such action in the remaining cases (without regard to the risk that the evidence may
be lost in the interim) is because the police could have (and thus, apparently, should
have) included the discovered object in the first warrant.
W. LAFAvE, supra note 92, § 4.11 (d), at 351-52 (footnotes omitted). See also The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, supra note 90, at 244-46.
99 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
100 In his Coolidge dissent, Justice White similarly reasoned:
If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as well as a rifle and
they proceed to seek a warrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberately
including the rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only
oversight or careless mistake would explain the omission in the warrant application
if the police were convinced they had probable cause to search for the photograph.
403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
101 One commentator has asserted that courts often do not exclude evidence which
was not listed in a warrant because of a mistake or oversight. Instead, courts "regularly
characterize as 'inadvertent' the discovery of items as to which it appears the police
could have made a probable cause showing in advance had it occurred to them to do
so." W. LAFAvE, supra note 92, § 4.11(d), at 354-55 (footnote omitted).
102 Horton, I10 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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omit from a warrant items which they had probable cause to search
for in order to avoid an often time-consuming warrant process.
103
However, while in some circumstances the officers could be moti-
vated to avoid a time-consuming warrant process, as later discussed,
Justice Brennan failed to demonstrate the diminishing of any fourth
amendment interest.1
04
The objective standard of inadvertency also penalizes officers
for requesting authority for an intrusion narrower in scope than the
constitutional limits. For example, suppose an officer subjectively
believes that probable cause does not exist to search for an item,
and thus does not include the item in his or her warrant request.
While searching for items in a warrant, the officer observes the un-
listed item in plain view and seizes it. Under the objective standard
of inadvertency, if the court later determines that probable cause
existed to search for the unlisted item, then the evidence is
excluded.
Thus, under the objective standard of inadvertency, officers
would be more likely to name more items in their warrant requests,
because if probable cause is later found for a seized, but unlisted
item, it will be excluded. By naming numerous items in a request,
the warrant process becomes more and more complicated and time-
consuming. In addition, the scope of the search is expanded to in-
clude places where the additional items may be located, resulting in
further invasion of the suspect's privacy. Thus, the objective stan-
dard of inadvertency penalizes an officer for avoiding warrants
which expand the search to the outer constitutional limits.
Finally, the objective probable cause standard for inadvertency
causes evidentiary problems in exclusionary hearings.10 5 Under this
standard, officers in effect argue that probable cause did not exist
for items not included in the warrant but seized under the plain view
doctrine. At the same time, the defendant argues that the officers
had probable cause and a warrant could have been obtained. By
encouraging officers to suppress facts which would result in a find-
ing of objective probable cause, the objective probable cause stan-
dard for inadvertency fails to encourage an accurate fact-finding
process. 0 6
The preceding examination of the practical effects of both the
subjective and objective definitions of inadvertency exhibits the re-
103 Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 See infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text for an explanation of the inadver-
tent discovery requirement's protection of fourth amendment interests.
105 W. LAFAvE, supra note 92, § 4.11(d), at 353-54.
106 Id. at 354 (citing The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 90, at 245).
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quirement's inherent costs on the law enforcement process. The
abolition of the inadvertent discovery requirement eliminates arbi-
trary exclusion of evidence, the suppression of incriminating evi-
dence because of mistake or oversight, the penalizing of law
enforcement officers for requesting narrow warrants, and inaccurate
fact-finding in evidentiary hearings. Thus, in Horton, Justice Stevens
correctly assessed these costs, and by eliminating the inadvertency
requirement to the plain view doctrine, removed an unnecessary
burden on effective law enforcement.
B. QUIETING THE CONCERN FOR A DIMINISHED FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court's abolition of the plain view doctrine's inadvertent
discovery requirement in Horton raises concern over the fourth
amendment's prohibition of general searches and seizures. 10 7 By
requiring that a warrant specify the place to be searched, the fourth
amendment protects privacy interests. Similarly, the fourth amend-
ment protects possessory interests by requiring that a warrant spe-
cifically describe the items to be seized. l08 In Horton,Justice Stevens
correctly concluded that the plain view doctrine without the inad-
vertency requirement protected fourth amendment interests
through the continued prohibition of general searches.' 0 9 Justice
Stevens effectively demonstrated that the inadvertency requirement
was not necessary to protect privacy interests, although he failed to
sufficiently address the effect of the inadvertency requirement on
possessory interests. Nevertheless, an examination of the plain view
doctrine reveals that the inadvertency requirement does not further
any privacy or possessory interest. Thus, in Horton, the Court cor-
rectly abolished this unneeded limitation on the plain view doctrine.
As pointed out by Justice Stevens" l0 and conceded by Justice
107 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that indis-
criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants'
were the immediate evils that motiviated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment."); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)
("The very purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to outlaw such [general] searches
.... "); Standford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (framers' intent was that people
should be secure "from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled
authority of a general warrant").
108 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another.").
109 Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990).
110 id. at 2310.
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Brennan,"'I the inadvertency requirement provides no protection of
privacy interests. 12 As Justice Stevens demonstrated, privacy inter-
ests are protected by other limitations on the scope of a plain view
search. Under the plain view doctrine, a warrant specifically
describing the place to be searched and the items to be seized au-
thorizes the invasion of privacy.11 3 The scope of the invasion or
search is limited to areas where the items listed in the warrant could
be found, and the search must conclude upon the location of the
listed items. 1 1 4 If, during the course of the search, officers observe
an item not listed in the warrant, no further privacy interest is in-
vaded through its seizure. 1 5 For example, in Horton, the search was
limited to areas in which the robbery proceeds could be located and,
upon location of the robbery proceeds, the search would conclude.
After the officers entered Horton's home under a warrant to search
for the robbery proceeds, no further privacy interest was invaded by
the officer's observation of the robbery weapons.
In establishing the plain view doctrine in Coolidge, Justice Stew-
art recognized an invasion of possessory interests by plain view
seizures, but concluded the interests of law enforcement out-
weighed this "minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections
... "116 Justice Stewart adopted the inadvertency requirement to
prevent any further invasion of possessory interests through general
searches.' 17 In Horton, Justice Brennan correctly argued that the
Court abolished the inadvertency requirement without discussing
the impact on possessory interests. 118 However, both Justice Stew-
111 "It is true that the inadvertent discovery requirement furthers no privacy inter-
ests." Id. at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 On the other hand, as the Solicitor General argued, the inadvertent discovery re-
quirement could actually lead to greater invasions of privacy. Under the inadvertency
rule, after observing incriminating evidence not listed in a warrant, officers would be
forced to remain on the premises until a warrant for the discovered items was obtained.
Thus, the officers stay is extended and the invasion of privacy increased. Solicitor Gen-
eral's Brief, supra note 96, at 19-20.
113 Exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as an arrest, also authorize the inva-
sion of privacy. See supra note 9 for a list of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
114 In the case of arrest, officers are limited to the areas in which the suspect could be
located, and the search terminates on his or her location.
115 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2306 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Illi-
nois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)).
116 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (plurality opinion).
117 "The Warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issu-
ance of any warrant except one 'particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.' The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement
was to prevent general searches." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
118 "The Court today eliminates a rule designed to further possessory interests on the




art and Justice Brennan were incorrect in their assertions that the
inadvertency requirement was required for the prohibition of gen-
eral searches and the protection of possessory interests.11 9
The requirement that the incriminating value of the items
seized be immediately apparent serves to prohibit general seizures
and protect the suspect's possessory interests. In conducting a
search, officers remain unable to seize random items; they may only
seize an item about which probable cause exists to believe it consti-
tutes evidence of a crime or contraband. 20 In Horton for example,
the plain view seizure was upheld only because the incriminating
character of the weapons was immediately apparent. Thus, the in-
advertency requirement is not necessary to prohibit general
searches under the plain view doctrine.
Furthermore, any protection of possessory interests provided
by the inadvertent discovery requirement is arbitrary and inefficient,
because the possessory interests invaded by a plain view seizure are
the same whether or not the discovery was inadvertent. For exam-
ple, if the police seize two photographs under the plain view doc-
trine, one which they intended to seize and the other which they did
not, the owner's interest in retaining possession is the same with
each photograph. However, the inadvertent discovery requirement
protects only the photograph the officers did not anticipate finding.
On the other hand, the plain view doctrine without the inadver-
tency requirement is consistent with limitations governing the
seizure of publicly located items. If probable cause exists to believe
a publicly located item is associated with a crime, then an officer may
seize that item. 12' While only a search involves privacy interests, a
public seizure and a plain view seizure during a search involve the
same possessory interests. Under the plain view doctrine, the intru-
sion on privacy interests is authorized by a warrant or exigent cir-
cumstances, and the invasion of possessory interests authorized by
the incriminating character of the evidence. By abolishing the inad-
vertency requirement, the Court in Horton allows the plain view
seizures under circumstances consistent with the rules governing
public seizures.
Despite the assertions ofJustice Brennan in Horton and Justice
119 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
121 In Texas v. Brown, Justice Stevens commented:
[I]f an officer has probable cause to believe that a publicly situated item is associated
with criminal activity, the interest in possession is outweighed by the risk that such
an item might disappear or be put to its intended use before a warrant could be
obtained. The officer may therefore seize it without a warrant.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Stewart in Coolidge, the inadvertency requirement furthers no fourth
amendment interest. Justice Stevens effectively demonstrated that
the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine effectively
protect privacy interests through the continued prohibition of gen-
eral searches. After Horton, the plain view doctrine also continues to
protect possessory interests by prohibiting general seizures. Thus,
the abolition of the inadvertency requirement eliminated an unnec-
essary restriction on plain view searches.
C. THE STATUS OF PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES AFTER HORTON
The abolition of the inadvertent discovery requirement argua-
bly permits abuse of the plain view doctrine through pretextual ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, because such abuse is limited by the plain view
doctrine's other requirements and law enforcement substantially
benefits, the Court correctly abolished the inadvertency require-
ment in Horton. Pretextual issues arise when the officer conducts a
search or seizure for reasons different than those underlying the
creation of the fourth amendment power authorizing the search or
seizure. 12 2 For example, an officer obtains a warrant to search a sus-
pect's home for evidence related to Crime A, when the officer's ac-
tual motivation for the search is to make a plain view seizure of
evidence related to Crime B. 123 Similarly, in hopes of making a
plain view seizure, an officer times his arrest in order to gain access
to an area for which he does not have probable cause to search.
124
In both these examples, the officer uses a justified intrusion as a
subterfuge to make a plain view search and seizure. The plain view
doctrine unequivocally was not created to allow an officer to inten-
tionally circumvent the fourth amendment requirement that a war-
rant specifically describe the items to be seized.
122 See Haddad, supra note 87, at 641-43.
128 In Horton, Justice Brennan referred to a similar example of pretextual activity:
For example, if an officer enters a house pursuant to a warrant to search for evi-
dence of one crime when he is really interested only in seizing evidence related to
another crime, for which he does not have a warrant, his search is "pretextual" and
the fruits of that search should be suppressed.
110 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Kelsey, 592 S.W.2d 509
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)). Justice Brennan explained the Kelsey holding in a parenthetical
following his citation of the case; he wrote that the
evidence [was] suppressed because [the] officers, who had ample opportunity to
obtain warrant relating to murder investigation, entered the premises instead pur-
suant to a warrant relating to a drug investigation, and searched only the hiding
place of the murder weapon, rather than conducting a "top to bottom" search for
drugs.
Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
124 Id. at 1214 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating examples of pretextual activity).
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In United States v. Scott 125 and United States v. Villamonte-Mar-
quez, 126 the Court decided to evaluate fourth amendment issues
under objective standards. Unfortunately, these decisions made the
constitutional status of pretextual searches and seizures unclear. In
Scott, while conducting a wiretapping, officers intercepted all calls
despite a court order to monitor only those calls of evidentiary
value.127 The Court upheld the searches "under a standard of ob-
jective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or
motivation of the officers involved." 128 In Villamonte-Marquez, under
authorization of a statute which allows officers to board vessels for
document-inspection, officers boarded a vessel "without any suspi-
cion of wrongdoing." 129 Although noting the possibility of pretext,
the Court dismissed this argument by relying on their rejection in
Scott of a "subjective" approach to fourth amendment issues.130
Through the abolition of the inadvertency requirement in Horton,
the Court continued to evaluate the lawfulness of searches and
seizures without regard to the officer's intent.
Justice Stevens failed to comment on the effect of the abolition
of the inadvertency requirement on pretextual searches. The facts
of Horton did not confront the Court with a pretextual search. In the
affidavit requesting the search warrant, the seizing officer attempted
to comply with the fourth amendment's warrant requirements by re-
ferring to a police report that described the robbery weapons. As
probable cause existed to search for both the weapons and the pro-
ceeds, the omission of weapons from the warrant can be explained
only as a mistake or oversight. Thus, while holding that inadvertent
discovery is not necessary to make a plain view seizure, the Court in
Horton did not explicitly hold that pretextual searches are
constitutional.
However, absent a return to subjective standards, the abolition
of the inadvertency requirement in Horton allows abuse of the plain
view doctrine through pretextual searches. The seizures of items in
125 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
126 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
127 Scott, 436 U.S. at 131-32.
128 Id. at 138.
129 Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 581.
130 Id. at 584 n.3. The court stated in Villamonte-Marquez:
Respondents, however, contend in the alternative that because the customs officers
were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an inform-
ant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana, they
may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's docu-
mentation. This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v.




the above examples of pretextual activity meet the two requirements
of the plain view doctrine remaining after Horton. First, the officer
legally entered the suspect's premises, either through the warrant to
search for items related to crime A or to arrest the suspect. Second,
in both examples, the incriminating character of the seized items
was immediately apparent. Thus, although conducted for reasons
contrary to the creation of the plain view doctrine, after Horton, the
seizures in the above examples of pretextual activity would not be
found unlawful.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan incorrectly concluded that
pretextual searches remain unconstitutional after Horton.' 31 Justice
Brennan gave examples of pretextual activity similar to the above
examples and asserted that "[s]uch conduct would be a deliberate
attempt to circumvent the constitutional requirement of a warrant
'particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized,' and cannot be condoned."' 3 2 However, Justice
Brennan made this assertion without demonstrating how the plain
view doctrine as applied in Horton would prevent pretextual
searches.
In support of.his conclusion, Justice Brennan cited two states
which did not accept the plain view doctrine's inadvertency require-
ment, but continued to view pretextual searches as unconstitu-
tional.18 3 However, the cases to which Justice Brennan refers not
only do not involve pretextual activity, but they also fail to demon-
strate how the plain view doctrine will prohibit the above examples
of pretextual activity.' 3 4
13l Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2313-14 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Commentators have disputed whether the Court has ever held pretextual activity in it-
self unconstitutional. One commentator has argued that, in cases before and after Scott
and Villamonte, the Court acknowledged that pretextual searches are unconstitutional.
Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See it, Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH: J.L. REF.
523, 544-48 (1984). On the other hand, another commentator has argued:
In fact, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court has never ordered lower court
exclusion of evidence because on a particular occasion an officer, although acting
within the fourth amendment, was improperly motivated. Frequently, however, the
Court has expanded fourth amendment limitations upon police in part to reduce
the opportunity and incentive for officers to engage in pretextual fourth amend-
ment activity.
Haddad, supra note 87, at 653.
132 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2314 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Bussard, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204,
n.2 (Idaho App. 1988); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 n.1 (Utah 1986)).
134 In State v. Bussard, the court allowed a plain view seizure only when the evidence
was discovered during permissible police behavior. Bussard, 760 P.2d at 1204. The
court stated that this requirement had been improperly referred to as the inadvertent
discovery requirement. Id. at 1204 n.2. The court concluded that taken together, Coo-
lidge and Brown "make it clear that the police may not use the warrant as a pretext to look
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Thus, while not holding pretextual searches constitutional, ab-
sent a return to subjective standards, the Court in Horton appears to
allow abuse of the plain view doctrine through pretextual activity.
However, such abuse will be limited severely by the plain view doc-
trine's requirements that the initial intrusion be lawful and that the
incriminating character of the evidence viewed be immediately
apparent.
VI. CONCLUSION
By abolishing the inadvertent discovery requirement, the Court
in Horton removed an unnecessary limitation on the plain view doc-
trine. Although failing to address all the possible alternatives, the
Court correctly concluded that the abolition of the inadvertency re-
quirement enhances effective law enforcement. Also, the plain view
doctrine after Horton continues to protect fourth amendment inter-
ests through the prohibition of general searches and seizures. Fi-
nally, while not holding pretextual searches constitutional, the
Court's abolition of the inadvertency requirement permits limited
abuse of the plain view doctrine through pretextual activity. How-
ever, the Court correctly abolished the inadvertent discovery re-
quirement considering the substantial enhancement of law
enforcement and the continued protection of fourth amendment
interests.
RICHARD J. HALL
for additional items in places or at times unrelated to the search authorized by the war-
rant." Id. However, in Bussard, the facts did not confront the court with a pretextual
issue, and the court failed to demonstrate how pretextual activity will be prohibited with-
out the inadvertent discovery requirement.
In State v. Kelly, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that they previously failed to
adopt the inadvertency requirement. Kelly, 718 P.2d at 389 n.1 (citing State v. Romero,
660 P.2d 715, 718 n.3 (Utah 1983)). However, the court further stated, "the plain view
exception may not be used merely as a pretext for a warrantless search, i.e., where of-
ficers know in advance that an item will be present and use that knowledge as justifica-
tion for a warrantless search and seizure." Id. The court demonstrated the effects of
this requirement by referring to a case in which officers knew illegal drugs were growing
on the suspect's premises, but did not observe the drugs until entering the premises
without a warrant. Id. at 389-90 n.1 (citing State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)).
The plain view seizure was disallowed "because the evidence was not discovered inci-
dent to a prior justified intrusion, but was instead the result of an uninvited entry by
which the officers achieved 'plain view.'" Id. (quoting Harris, 671 P.2d at 181). InJus-
tice Brennan's examples of pretextual activity, a warrant or arrest justifies the intrusion,
and thus the requirements for plain view seizures announced in Kelly fail to prohibit such
pretextual activity.
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